Never Ask a Woman Her Wage: The
Constitutionality of Salary-History Bans
Tyler M. Wood†
For over a half-century, legislatures have struggled to close the pay gap between men and women. Although the gap has shrunk substantially since Congress
passed the Equal Pay Act in 1963, in recent years, progress has slowed to a near
standstill. Why has the residual gap remained so persistent? Some argue that employers—by asking applicants to reveal their wage histories and then relying on that
information to set future wages—have forced women to carry wage discrimination
from job to job. Reacting to this argument, some states and cities have provided a
simple solution: ban salary-history inquiries.
This Comment addresses whether these salary-history bans are constitutional.
Responding to recent claims that these bans unconstitutionally burden employers’
right to free speech—namely, by restricting the questions that employers are allowed
to ask applicants—I argue that these bans permissibly restrict only the commercial
speech of employers. In making this argument, I seek to prove that—in any jurisdiction—salary-history bans should withstand the intermediate scrutiny afforded to
commercial speech restrictions. By assessing the structure, function, and (critically)
effectiveness of salary-history bans, this Comment finds that there is sufficient evidence to show that these bans directly and materially serve to shrink the genderwage gap. Therefore, I conclude that such laws are safely within the constitutional
authority of the governments that enact them.
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INTRODUCTION
Employers across the country consistently rely on applicants’
prior wages during the hiring process. The question “How much
did you earn in your previous job?” has become so commonplace
that approximately 30% to 50% of applicants are asked about
their pay history during the employment process, and, according
to one study, over 80% of these inquiries occurred before a job offer
was extended.1 At first blush, the question seems mundane. It is
unsurprising that employers give weight to their applicants’ wage
history and future wage expectations. Naturally, having to reveal
personal financial information can be uncomfortable, but, for
women, this question carries more than discomfort; it comes
loaded with generations of wage discrimination.
In the United States, despite countless efforts, the pay inequality between men and women remains a persistent issue.2
Researchers estimate that the difference in earnings attributable
1
See Moshe A. Barach & John J. Horton, How Do Employers Use Compensation
History?: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 39 J. LAB. ECON. 193, 208–09 (2021).
2
Although the existence of a gender-wage gap is generally accepted, its cause is a
topic of controversy. There is little doubt that factors other than discrimination contribute
to the wage gap. These factors may include gender differences in measures of human capital—such as experience, education, industry (particularly those with labor monopsony),
and career interruptions—as well as decisions about work-life balance and child-rearing.
See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and
Explanations, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 789, 797–804 (2017); CONSAD RSCH. CORP., AN
ANALYSIS OF REASONS FOR THE DISPARITY IN WAGES BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN 35–36
(2009). However, no study can account for the entire gap, and debate remains about
whether the residual, unexplained portion of the gap is caused by gender discrimination
or by some other factor. See, e.g., ALICE H. EAGLY & LINDA L. CARLI, THROUGH THE
LABYRINTH: THE TRUTH ABOUT HOW WOMEN BECOME LEADERS 70–71, 186 (2007);
CONSAD RSCH. CORP., supra, at 36. This Comment does not—and need not—take a position on the correct explanation of the gap. Rather, it premises its discussion on the uncontroverted facts that (1) a gender-wage gap exists and (2) some legislatures—determining
that the gap is a product of discrimination—have articulated an interest in closing it. Because this Comment concerns legislation passed with that interest in mind, it defers to
the legislatures’ judgment about the gap’s cause.
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to gender ranges from 17% to 33%.3 Based on these estimates,
perhaps the most commonly heard statistic is that women earn
77 cents for every dollar earned by men, though this figure varies.4
In light of this inequality, scholars have identified the salaryhistory inquiry as a practice that perpetuates wage disparity by
anchoring women to discriminatory pay as they move from job to
job.5 In other words, prior discriminatory wages influence future
wages through salary questioning, thereby creating a “sticky
gap.”6 In response, some advocates have sought to prohibit employers from asking job applicants about their prior pay.
Although salary-history information can create a discriminatory effect, it is not used exclusively for discriminatory purposes.
This information can provide employers with a metric to approximate applicants’ productivity.7 It might also help employers determine reservation wages (the lowest pay that an applicant
would be willing to accept for the job).8 Laws preventing salaryhistory inquiries (“salary-history bans”) could therefore impose
potentially significant costs on even nondiscriminatory employers.
3
See Orly Lobel, Knowledge Pays: Reversing Information Flows and the Future of
Pay Equity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 553 (2020); Sinha, supra note 1, at 2, 6; Torie Abbott
Watkins, Note, The Ghost of Salary Past: Why Salary History Inquiries Perpetuate the
Gender Pay Gap and Should Be Ousted as a Factor Other Than Sex, 103 MINN. L. REV.
1041, 1048 (2018); Jeff Meli & James C. Spindler, Salary History Bans and Gender Discrimination 4 (Univ. Tex. L. & Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. E587, 2019); Recent Legislation,
Equal Pay Legislation—Oregon Bans Employers from Asking Job Applicants About Prior
Salary, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1513 (2018) (noting a gender-pay gap in Oregon of 21%
(citing Table S2419: Class of Worker by Sex and Median Earnings in the Past 12 Months
(in 2016 Inflation-Adjusted Dollars) for the Full-Time, Year-Round Civilian Employed
Population 16 Years and Over, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/55HV-3NKE (select
“S2419” as table name and “Oregon” as state))).
4
Meli & Spindler, supra note 3, at 4. For women of color, this gap can be even wider.
According to one overview of wage disparity statistics, “[s]ince 1980, Asian women continue to make only $0.87 per dollar earned by white men; white women make $0.79; black
women make only $0.63; and Hispanic women make a mere $0.54 on the dollar.” Elizabeth
Lester-Abdalla, Note, Salary History Should Be Her Story: Upholding Regulations of Salary
History Through a Commercial Speech Analysis, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701, 703 (2018).
5
See Benjamin Hansen & Drew McNichols, Information and the Persistence of the
Gender Wage Gap: Early Evidence from California’s Salary History Ban 1 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27054, 2020) (citation omitted) (noting that proponents
of salary-history bans “have concluded that whatever has caused discrimination in the
past continues to be perpetuated by questions about current salaries that are commonplace for job applicants in today’s labor markets”).
6
Lobel, supra note 3, at 553.
7
See Barach & Horton, supra note 1, at 2.
8
See James Bessen, Erich Denk & Chen Meng, Perpetuating Inequality: What Salary History Bans Reveal About Wages 4, (B.U. Sch. of L., Pub. L. & Legal Theory Paper
No. 20-19, 2020); Sarah Brown & Karl Taylor, Reservation Wages, Expected Wages and
Unemployment, 119 ECON. LETTERS 276, 276–77 (2013).
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In the last decade, this tension between employers and salaryhistory ban proponents has led to numerous legal conflicts. First,
equal pay advocates turned to courts, arguing that the Equal Pay
Act9 (EPA) proscribes salary-history inquiries. This argument
had mixed success, however, due to a circuit split over a provision
in the EPA that provides an exception for pay disparities caused
by “a factor other than sex.”10 A second approach was to pursue
legislative redress by pushing state and local governments to incorporate salary-history bans into existing equal pay legislation.
This effort quickly gained traction. In just four years, over forty
states and localities have adopted salary-history bans in some
form.11 But in response to this quickly swelling wave of salaryhistory bans, business groups have actively fought to maintain
their ability to conduct salary-history inquiries.12
Recently, the debate between salary-history-ban proponents
and employers culminated in a Third Circuit case that raised a
new question of law: Do salary-history bans violate the First
Amendment?
In some respects, this question is one arising out of simple
legal strategy—for employers seeking to stem the growing tide of
salary-history bans, asserting a constitutional right to solicit this
information from applicants is a powerful vehicle for doing so. But
this claim also tests the boundaries of the commercial speech doctrine, highlighting the tension between employer speech rights
and the government interest in eradicating wage disparity. This
Comment seeks to resolve this tension by navigating the oftenambiguous commercial speech doctrine. I endeavor, first, to explain why salary-history bans should be understood as a regulation of commercial speech and, second, to demonstrate how these
bans would withstand the intermediate scrutiny to which they
would be subjected. This analysis requires an in-depth look at
how salary-history bans operate so as to prove that the bans are
effective at directly advancing the government’s interest in closing the wage gap.
To approach this argument, this Comment will proceed in four
parts. Part I describes the rise of state and local efforts to ban salary-history inquiries. With a growing number of salary-history
9

Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219).
See infra Part I.A (introducing the EPA circuit split and discussing its impact on
the salary-history-ban movement).
11 See infra Part I.A.
12 See infra Part I.C.
10
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bans, it is useful to detail how tensions rose and why the First
Amendment is being used to push against the movement. Part II
focuses on the test for understanding when a regulation impermissibly restricts commercial speech. This Part also explains how
courts determine whether speech is commercial and, importantly,
why salary-history bans are properly assessed under the commercial speech framework. Part III then provides an analysis of salaryhistory bans, paying particular attention to whether these laws
directly advance the government interest in reducing the pay gap.
In this Part, I argue in favor of the theoretical strengths of these
laws, while also pointing out the deficiencies in the arguments
that salary-history bans are yet another form of ban-the-box legislation that will backfire against women. I further highlight early
data indicating that banning salary-history inquiries likely has a
net positive effect for reducing wage disparity, lending strong
support for the conclusion that these laws directly and materially
advance the government interest. A final Part concludes that
salary-history bans do not violate the First Amendment.
I. SALARY-HISTORY BANS AND THEIR OPPOSITION
A.

The Movement to Prohibit Salary-History Inquiries

The gender-wage gap is not a new phenomenon. Legislative
efforts to correct wage disparities emerged as early as 1945, when
Congress considered the Women’s Equal Pay Act.13 Though the
1945 Act failed to pass, throughout the following decades, the issue
of equal pay received consistent congressional attention.14 Eventually, in 1963, Congress passed the EPA, which “prohibit[ed] discrimination on account of sex in the payment of wages.”15 In the
years that followed, the gender-wage gap closed significantly. In
1962, shortly before the EPA was passed, median earnings for
women were 40% less than those for men.16 By 2007, that gap had
been reduced to 19.8%.17 Since then, however, the wage gap has

13

See S. Rep. No. 1576, at 1–2 (1946).
See Janet A. Johnson, The Equal Pay Act of 1963: A Practical Analysis, 24 DRAKE
L. REV. 570, 572 (1975).
15 77 Stat. at 56.
16 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SER. P-60, NO. 41, INCOME OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN
THE UNITED STATES: 1962, at 2 (1963).
17 CONSAD RSCH. CORP., supra note 2, at 4. Whether the EPA was responsible for
this gap reduction is a subject for debate, but at least some research suggests that it had
a favorable impact on women’s earnings. See Blau & Kahn, supra note 2, at 847–49;
14
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been largely stagnant, with current estimates of the overall wage
gap showing that the average woman earns between 80 and
83 cents for each dollar earned by a man.18
Although the EPA generally bars employers from paying disparate wages for equal work—a practice that naturally contributes to the overall wage gap—the act creates an exception for distinctions “made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”19 But these apparently neutral bases for setting
wages may nevertheless perpetuate the pay gap. This Comment
discusses just one of these potentially pernicious practices: the
salary-history inquiry.
In order to successfully prohibit salary-history inquiries under the EPA, ban proponents were tasked with demonstrating
that pay history is not a “factor other than sex” to justify a pay
discrepancy. In a series of lawsuits, opponents to salary-history
inquiries argued that, because a woman’s salary history may reflect past wage discrimination, it is impermissible under the EPA
to use that information to set future wages.20 However, this effort
quickly became entangled in a broader circuit split over the application of the EPA’s “factor other than sex” exception. On one
side of this split, the Ninth Circuit says that this factor needs to be
job-related—“experience, educational background, ability, or prior
job performance,” for example.21 On the other side, the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits broadly interpret the exception to cover anything
other than a purely gender-based differential.22 And in the
Suzanne M. Crampton, John W. Hodge & Jitendra M. Mishra, The Equal Pay Act: The
First 30 Years, 26 PUB. PERS. MGMT. 335, 339–41 (1997).
18 Lobel, supra note 3, at 553–54; see also Eileen Patten, Racial, Gender Wage Gaps
Persist in U.S. Despite Some Progress, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 1, 2016),
https://perma.cc/28T5-497N.
19 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
20 See, e.g., Irby v. Bittick, 830 F. Supp. 632, 636 (M.D. Ga. 1993), aff’d, 44 F.3d 949
(11th Cir. 1995); Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 717 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Taylor also argues
that, as a matter of law, an employer should not be allowed to rely on prior salary or a
salary retention policy as a defense under the EPA because reliance on such factors permits the perpetuation of unequal wage structures.”); Appellee’s Answering Brief at 32–33,
Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-15372) (“Use of prior salary alone . . .
essentially continues illegal practices of other employers and perpetuates the historical
pay gap.”).
21 Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc), vacated on other
grounds, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019).
22 See Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The fourth affirmative
defense . . . is a broad ‘catch-all’ exception and embraces an almost limitless number of
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middle, the Eleventh Circuit holds that “the ‘factor other than sex’
exception applies when the disparity results from unique characteristics of the same job; from an individual’s experience, training,
or ability; or from special exigent circumstances connected with
the business.”23
Because of this split, courts disagree about whether salary
history is an acceptable factor to justify a pay discrepancy. Thus,
in the Ninth Circuit, opponents to salary-history inquiries successfully argued that, because salary history bears only an “attenuated” relationship to factors such as “work experience, ability,
performance, or any other job-related quality,” the EPA does not
permit prior wages to justify gender-wage discrepancies.24 Conversely, the Seventh Circuit—maintaining that a “factor other
than sex” need not be business-related—held that, because market wages encompass more than discrimination, salary-history
information can be used to justify a pay discrepancy under the
EPA.25 Taking the middle approach, the Eleventh Circuit held
that salary history can be relied on so long as it is used in combination with some other job-related factor.26
Perhaps recognizing that the EPA circuit split creates a barrier
for a uniform, workable answer to the legality of salary-history
inquiries, opponents to the practice have recently sought to directly regulate it. In 2016, Massachusetts became the first state
to pass a law explicitly prohibiting employers from asking applicants about their past wages.27 A wave of cities and states soon
followed Massachusetts in banning salary-history inquiries.28
Currently, twenty states and territories have imposed some form
factors, so long as they do not involve sex.”); Taylor, 321 F.3d at 717–18 (“On its face, the
EPA does not suggest any limitations to the broad catch-all ‘factor other than sex’ affirmative defense. . . . [W]e are reluctant to establish any per se limitations . . . by carving out
specific, non-gender-based factors for exclusion from the exception.”).
23 See Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988).
24 Rizo, 887 F.3d at 467.
25 See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 469–70 (7th Cir. 2005).
26 See Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n Equal Pay Act defendant may successfully raise the affirmative defense of ‘any other factor other than sex’ if he
proves that he relied on prior salary and experience in setting a ‘new’ employee’s salary.”
(alteration in original)).
27 Stacy Cowley, Illegal in Massachusetts: Asking Your Salary in a Job Interview,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/8HCD-LJ5M.
28 See Associated Press, What’s Your Past Salary? Lawmakers Want to Ban the Question, IDAHO BUS. REV. (May 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/4G34-242X (“Massachusetts, New
York City and Philadelphia have passed laws that bar employers from asking applicants
about their salary history. And several states, including Idaho, California, Mississippi and
Pennsylvania, have proposed similar legislation this year.”).
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of salary-history ban.29 An additional twenty-one localities have
done the same, including New York City,30 Philadelphia,31 Kansas
City,32 and San Francisco.33
B.

The Anatomy of a Salary-History Ban

Not all salary-history bans have the same scope, and so it
is worth specifying which of these bans are the subject of this
Comment. For instance, several bans were created by executive
order and extend only to government employers.34 This Comment
does not address those self-imposed bans. Instead, it focuses only
on salary-history-ban legislation that regulates private employers. In this context, salary-history bans are sufficiently similar to
avoid the necessity of addressing the particularities of each individual state and local ban. Instead, a selective sampling of these
laws will adequately illuminate the potentially relevant differences among salary-history bans more generally.
The biggest difference in the way that salary-history bans operate is the extent to which these laws permit employers to consider voluntarily disclosed salary-history information. For example, in Massachusetts—the first state to enact a salary-history
ban—an employer may not request wage-history information
from an applicant or the applicant’s current or former employer.35
But an employer in Massachusetts may use voluntarily disclosed
29 See ALA. CODE § 25-1-30 (2019); CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (West 2019); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 8-5-102 (2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-40z (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709B
(West 2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.4 (2019); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 112/10 (2019); ME.
STAT. tit. 5, § 4577 (2019); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-304.2 (West 2020); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A (2018); MICH. EXEC. DIRECTIVE 2019-10; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:6B-20 (West 2020); N.Y. LAB. L. § 194-a (McKinney 2020); N.C. EXEC. ORDER No. 93
(Apr. 2, 2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220 (2020); PA. EXEC. ORDER No. 2018-03; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 495m (2018); Alena Yarmosky, Governor Northam Announces Employment
Equity Initiative for State Agencies, OFF. VA. GOVERNOR, (June 20, 2019),
https://perma.cc/TAF8-BKU3; WASH. REV. CODE § 49.58.100 (2019); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 29, § 254 (2020).
30 N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 8-107(25) (2017).
31 PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1131(2) (2017).
32 KAN. CITY, MO., CODE § 38-102 (2019).
33 S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 33J, §§ 3300J.1–3300J.8 (2018). For a full account of
states and localities with laws concerning salary-history inquiries, see Salary History
Bans: A Running List of States and Localities That Have Outlawed Pay History Questions,
HR DIVE (Aug. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/6J5A-QVFV.
34 See, e.g., PA. EXEC. ORDER No. 2018-03; Yarmosky, supra note 29; CITY OF NEW
ORLEANS MAYOR’S OFF., MAYOR LANDRIEU ISSUES EXECUTIVE ORDER TO ADDRESS EQUAL
PAY FOR WOMEN (Jan. 25, 2017); SALT LAKE CITY HUM. RES., POLICY 3.01.10: GENDER PAY
EQUITY (Mar. 1, 2018).
35 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(c)(2) (2018).
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or publicly available information about an applicant’s wage history to set future wages, so long as that employer did not induce
the initial disclosure.36 New Jersey similarly allows employers to
consider pay history when determining an applicant’s salary, but
only if the applicant voluntarily disclosed his or her pay history.37
In a minority of states—like Illinois, for example—employers
may not consider even voluntarily disclosed wage history.38
Though slight, this difference is worth noting because, as will be
discussed in Part III.D, it might limit applicants’ strategic options. Specifically, by making voluntary disclosure ineffective, the
Illinois approach creates a different wage-bargaining environment
than that of Massachusetts and New Jersey by restricting applicants’ ability to leverage their prior wages when advantageous.39
Notwithstanding this variation in the extent to which employers are permitted to rely upon voluntarily disclosed information, salary-history bans are remarkably similar. For example,
no ban—even in states with more protective disclosure provisions—prevents an employer from asking prospective employees
about their desired or expected wages, so long as this question is
not posed in such a way as to intentionally elicit salary history.40
And all salary-history bans ultimately serve the same functional
goal: prohibiting employers from soliciting an applicant’s wage
history. This broad similarity in salary-history bans consequently
gives rise to the possibility of a uniform solution to the salaryhistory inquiry debate without the need to resolve the deeper EPA
circuit split. Recognizing this potential, employers seeking to preserve the salary-history inquiry are left with two options: either
prevent salary-history bans from spreading further or find a solution to defeat them altogether. This Comment now turns its
attention to the ways in which employers have sought to protect
their ability to ask applicants about their past salaries.

36

See OFF. OF THE MASS. ATT’Y GEN., AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PAY EQUITY: OVERVIEW
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 14 (2018) (noting that an employer may seek an applicant’s wage information from a public source); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(c)(2)
(2018) (allowing an employer to confirm an applicant’s voluntarily disclosed salary-history
information and to request such information after making an employment offer with
compensation).
37 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-20(h) (West 2020).
38 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 112/10(b-20) (2019).
39 See infra Part III.D. Although this distinction is worth noting, the difference is not
dispositive given the other arguments in Part III.
40 See OFF. OF THE MASS. ATT’Y GEN., supra note 36, at 13–14.
AND
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Opposition to Salary-History Bans

As states and localities continued to pass salary-history bans,
pushback mounted against these measures.41 Employers emphasized that, from a practical standpoint, prohibiting salary inquiries creates a significant burden. These employers want to get the
most productive labor at the lowest wage, and knowing in advance what an applicant is likely to accept will help an employer
identify optimal candidates and offer employment at a competitive rate.42 Moreover, companies with a multistate presence argued the patchwork of regulations creates high compliance costs
that would negatively impact businesses.43
Salary-history-ban opponents also argued that the bans are
an ineffective—and possibly counterproductive—way to promote
wage equality. The thrust of this argument is that, given the complex and multifaceted nature of the gender-wage gap, prohibiting
employers from accessing wage-history information is an oversimplified solution.44 This simplicity created the concern that the
bans could lead to unintended consequences that might harm the
women that the laws were enacted to protect. As momentum built
for the effort to eliminate the salary-history inquiry, Professor
Jennifer Doleac was frequently in the news to voice her concern
over the potential adverse impact of these laws.45 She argued that
without information about a candidate’s prior wages, employers—
who clearly value this information—will make assumptions that
might harm women.46 For employers hoping to maintain the ability to gather wage-history information, the takeaway was that,
although wage equality is an important issue, salary-history

41 See Martha T. Moore, ‘What’s Your Current Salary?’ ‘None of Your Business!’, PEW
CHARITABLE TRS. (June 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/E23Y-7P9L.
42 See Paul Davidson, ‘What’s Your Salary?’ Becomes a No-No in Job Interviews, USA
TODAY (Apr. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/95DU-YNZG (“[M]any companies use salary history to set pay and manage their costs. ‘It’s hard to figure out how to pay somebody a fair
amount.’ . . . ‘You’re looking at getting the best employee you can but . . . [also] trying to
save the company money.’”); Associated Press, supra note 28.
43 Moore, supra note 41.
44 See id. (“‘Right now, we can’t even agree what’s causing’ pay inequity.” (quoting
Mike Aitken, Senior Vice President of Membership, Soc’y for Hum. Res. Mgmt.)).
45 See, e.g., id.; see also Noam Scheiber, If a Law Bars Asking Your Past Salary, Does
It Help or Hurt?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/3PG3-EEG9; Oliver Staley,
Amazon Won’t Ask Your Old Salary, a Rule That May Actually Hurt Women, QUARTZ (Jan.
18, 2018), https://perma.cc/9Q8F-689D.
46 See Staley, supra note 45. This Comment will return to the merit of this argument
later. See infra Part III.D.
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bans’ uncertain benefits do not justify imposing additional hiring
costs.47
Having raised these concerns, employers and sympathetic governments endeavored to stop the proliferation of salary-history
bans. This opposition has taken many forms. In some instances,
the governor vetoed salary-history-ban legislation.48 In other
cases, state legislatures have moved to preempt localities from
passing salary-history bans.49 Recently, some business owners
have turned to a third approach: challenging salary-history bans
under the First Amendment. The next Section sketches the contours of this novel First Amendment claim.
D. The First Amendment Challenge
The first time that employers claimed a First Amendment
right to ask employees about their prior wages was in a lawsuit
seeking to invalidate Philadelphia’s wage equity ordinance. Enacted in 2018, this ordinance positioned the city as one of the
earliest adopters of the salary-history ban.50 In all respects, the
ordinance was a typical salary-history ban, similar to the laterenacted New Jersey law discussed in Part I.B.51 Predictably,
many members of the business community objected to the new
regulation.52 In light of those objections, the Philadelphia

47 See Moore, supra note 41 (“Prohibiting employers from asking about a previous
salary ‘doesn’t get to the root of the problem and just causes more problems in the hiring
process.’” (quoting Wendy Block, Vice President of Bus. Advoc. and Member Engagement,
Mich. Chamber of Com.)).
48 See H.B. 211, 166th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2019) (failing to override the Governor’s veto); Dan Petrella, New Law Will Bar Illinois Employers from Asking Job Applicants for Pay History, CHI. TRIB. (July 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/D6ET-BP37 (noting that,
before Governor J.B. Pritzker signed the Illinois salary-history ban, former Governor
Bruce Rauner twice vetoed similar legislation).
49 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 123.1384 (2018); WIS. STAT. § 103.36(3)(a) (2018); see also
Jeffrey Fritz, Banning the Bans: Michigan and Wisconsin Buck the Salary History Ban
Trend, JD SUPRA (Apr. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/9W97-A5Z5; Lobel, supra note 3, at 570–
71 (noting that a handful of other states have attempted, but failed, to enact laws preempting local attempts to pass salary-history bans).
50 See Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Philadelphia Employers Can’t Ask About Salary History,
SHRM (Feb. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZK9X-4SPP.
51 See PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1131(1) (2017) (providing justification for the wage ordinance by citing the gender-wage gap, the slow progress in closing it, and the role that
reliance on past wages has on perpetuating inequality).
52 See Complaint at 2, Chamber of Com. for Greater Phila. v. City of Philadelphia
(Chamber I), 319 F. Supp. 3d 773 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (No. 17-1548) (“[T]he Chamber—like the
business community it represents—strongly supports the goal of eliminating gender-based
wage discrimination. . . . The Ordinance, however, . . . will not advance gender wage
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Chamber of Commerce (“Chamber”) set out to defeat the new law.
Filing in federal court, the Chamber argued that, by prohibiting
employers from asking for applicants’ wage-history information,
the Philadelphia ordinance violated the free speech rights of the
Chamber’s member businesses.53
In Chamber of Commerce for Greater Philadelphia v. City of
Philadelphia (Chamber I),54 the district court held that the wage
ordinance violated the First Amendment. However, it declined to
review the salary-history ban with the heightened scrutiny that
would be applied to traditional speech regulations. Instead, it determined that the burdened speech—asking about salary history—is “commercial speech,” which is subject to only intermediate
scrutiny. Nevertheless, even applying this lesser scrutiny, the
court held that the regulation was improper, finding that the city
had failed to offer sufficient proof that the bans would reduce
gender-wage disparity.55
Last year, however, in Greater Philadelphia Chamber of
Commerce v. City of Philadelphia (Chamber II),56 the Third Circuit
reversed. Although the appellate court agreed that the Philadelphia
ordinance implicated commercial speech (and thus was subject to
intermediate scrutiny),57 it disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the government had not met its burden for justifying
the restriction.58 This decision delivered a significant win to salaryhistory ban advocates. Even so, neither Chamber I nor Chamber II
sets out a definitive resolution for future First Amendment challenges to salary-history bans, offering reasoning largely limited
to arguments about party- and case-specific facts. In the sections
to follow, this Comment will seek to provide that resolution. In
the process, it will return to the particularities of the Chamber I
and Chamber II decisions. But first, it is important to understand
what the commercial speech doctrine is and how it limits the
speech protections for salary-history inquiries.

equality, but instead will chill the protected speech of employers and immeasurably complicate their task of making informed hiring decisions.”).
53 See id. at 13–17.
54 319 F. Supp. 3d 773 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
55 See id. at 790.
56 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020).
57 See id. at 137–38.
58 See id. at 142–43.
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II. CATEGORIZING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
As alluded to above, one of the points of agreement between
the Chamber I and Chamber II decisions was the determination
that the Philadelphia wage ordinance regulated only commercial
speech. For the purposes of this Comment, this distinction is a
significant one: commercial speech has a unique place in First
Amendment jurisprudence in that it receives First Amendment
protection but not as much as other forms of protected speech.
Thus, in order to later understand the degree to which salaryhistory inquiries are protected by the First Amendment, this Part
provides an overview of the doctrine of commercial speech. It begins by discussing the origin of the commercial speech distinction
and the intermediate scrutiny test according to which commercial
speech regulations are reviewed. It next reviews the body of commercial speech jurisprudence to highlight the often-ambiguous line
between commercial and noncommercial speech before assessing
whether salary-history inquiries are properly characterized as
commercial speech. Once these concepts have been introduced,
this Part returns to Chamber I and Chamber II to understand
how courts have, in at least one instance, applied the commercial
speech doctrine to salary-history bans. This discussion will set up
Part III of this Comment, which evaluates whether salary-history
bans, on the whole, can withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
A.

Emergence of the Commercial Speech Doctrine

The modern commercial speech doctrine developed out of the
1976 case Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.59 In that case, the Supreme Court struck
down a Virginia law that prohibited pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices.60 In doing so, the Court held that
even “speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial
transaction’” is protected by the First Amendment.61 This holding
was a marked change from the Court’s earlier jurisprudence,
which had held—with little explanation—that “the Constitution
imposes no [ ] restraint on government as respects purely

59 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see also Helen Norton, You Can’t Ask (or Say) That: The First
Amendment and Civil Rights Restrictions on Decisionmaker Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 727, 741 (2003).
60 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 750–52, 770.
61 Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Hum. Rels., 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).

1260

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:5

commercial advertising.”62 Despite the Court’s decision that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, it continued
to recognize a distinction between commercial speech and other
forms of protected speech.63 This holding put commercial speech
in an awkward middle ground where the Court “afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,
while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in
the realm of noncommercial expression.”64 Not long after Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy, the Court would attempt to define the
scope of commercial speech protections by balancing “the nature
both of the expression and of the governmental interests served
by its regulation.”65
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,66 the Supreme Court developed a multipart test to assess whether a law restricting commercial speech
can be upheld. First, a court determines whether the speech is
“misleading [or] related to unlawful activity.”67 “The government
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public
than to inform it . . . or commercial speech related to illegal activity.”68 But if the speech is neither misleading nor unlawful, then
“the government’s power is more circumscribed.”69 At this point,
the burden switches to the government to assert “a substantial
interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech.”70 If
the government can articulate a substantial interest, then the
court evaluates the law’s impact. Specifically, the court asks
(1) whether the regulation “directly advances the governmental
62 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942); see also Alex Kozinski & Stuart
Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 627–29 (1990) (“Without
citing any cases, without discussing the purposes or values underlying the first amendment, and without even mentioning the first amendment except in stating Chrestensen’s
contentions, the Court found it clear as day that commercial speech was not protected by
the first amendment.”).
63 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (“In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are commonsense differences between speech that
does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction’ . . . and other varieties.” (quoting
Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385)).
64 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
65 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
66 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
67 See id. at 564.
68 Id. at 563–64.
69 Id. at 564.
70 Id.
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interest asserted”71 and (2) whether it is “not more extensive than
[ ] necessary to serve that interest.”72 But before a court can apply
the Central Hudson test, it must first determine whether the
speech interest at issue should be considered within the framework of commercial speech to begin with.
B.

When Speech Is Commercial

Categorizing commercial speech is not always a simple task,
and the Court has never drawn a clear line between commercial
and noncommercial speech. The Court in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy noted that “speech which does ‘no more than propose a
commercial transaction,’” clearly constitutes commercial
speech.73 Later, the Central Hudson Court advanced a broader approach. At issue in Central Hudson was a New York regulation
that “completely ban[ned] promotional advertising by an electrical utility.”74 The Court, in holding that the promotional advertising was a form of commercial speech, provided two ways to distinguish commercial speech from other protected forms. First,
commercial speech is “expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience.”75 Second, borrowing
language used in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court
acknowledged “the ‘commonsense’ distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties
of speech.” 76 In combination, the Central Hudson approach extended the reach of the commercial speech doctrine beyond that
which proposed no more than a commercial transaction.
But not all commercial speech can be identified as easily as
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and Central Hudson seemed to
suggest.77 In the case of Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,78
the Court was tasked with determining whether the First
Amendment proscribed a law that prohibited the direct mailing
71
72
73

Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
Id.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S.

at 385).
74

Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558.
Id. at 561.
76 Id. at 562 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56).
77 See Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (“More subject
to doubt, perhaps, are the precise bounds of the category of expression that may be termed
commercial speech.”).
78 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
75
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of unsolicited contraceptive advertising.79 The plaintiff, a manufacturer and distributor of contraceptives, sought to mail to the
general public three types of materials: “flyers promoting a large
variety of products available at a drugstore, including prophylactics”; “flyers exclusively or substantially devoted to promoting
prophylactics”; and “informational pamphlets discussing the desirability and availability of prophylactics.”80 The Court noted
that the advertising pamphlets at issue in the case fell within the
“no more than propose a commercial transaction” language, but
it found that this distinction was inadequate for the informational
pamphlets.81 Instead, the Court identified three characteristics of
these pamphlets: that they (1) contained advertisements, (2) referenced a specific product, and (3) had an economic motivation.
Though any of these factors individually might not be sufficient
to render the materials to be commercial speech, the Court found
that the presence of all three of these factors “provide[d] strong
support for the . . . conclusion that the informational pamphlets
[were] properly characterized as commercial speech.”82
Ten years after Bolger, in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc.,83 the Court once again faced the “difficulty of
drawing bright lines that [ ] clearly cabin commercial speech in a
distinct category,” and it once again failed to draw those lines.84
Rejecting the Central Hudson approach that would apply the
commercial speech distinction to a “somewhat larger category of
. . . ‘expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience,’” the Court endorsed a notion that the
“core” commercial speech is that which proposes no more than a
commercial transaction.85 But the Court offered little guidance for
how to identify this speech in practice. In part, it appeared to
adopt Bolger’s approach: that for “close[ ] question[s],” commercial speech should be identified by carefully examining the commercial nature of the particular speech interest.86 But it also
showed some inclination to adopt a narrow approach that would
take into account only whether there was a proposal of a

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

See id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 66 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762).
Id. at 67.
507 U.S. 410 (1993).
Id. at 419.
Id. at 422–23 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561).
See id. (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–67).
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commercial transaction.87 Ultimately, however, the Court declined to definitively resolve the ambiguity in the commercial
speech definition, emphasizing instead that “[t]here is no doubt a
‘commonsense’ basis for distinguishing between” what is and is
not “core” commercial speech.88 “[T]he difference,” it noted, “is a
matter of degree.”89
As the foregoing demonstrates, the Court has left much to be
desired in the search for a clear definition of commercial speech.
As a baseline, the Court has identified that the “core” of commercial speech is that which “does ‘no more than propose a commercial
transaction.’” 90 But the Supreme Court has, in large part, left it
to the lower courts to identify commercial speech using their common sense.91 And “[b]ecause of the difficulty of drawing clear lines
between commercial and non-commercial speech,” courts will typically make the distinction either by taking a “fact-driven” approach—using the Bolger factors as a guideline—or by analogical
reasoning.92 As the next Section will discuss, salary-history inquiries are best understood as a form of commercial speech, regardless of whether a court takes a fact-driven approach or relies
on analogous cases.

87 Id. at 423 (citing Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473–474
(1989)); see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637 (“Our commercial speech doctrine rests heavily
on ‘the “common-sense” distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction
. . . and other varieties of speech.’” (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56)).
88 Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 423.
89 Id.
90 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S.
at 385); see also Erin Bernstein & Theresa J. Lee, Where the Consumer Is the Commodity:
The Difficulty with the Current Definition of Commercial Speech, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV.
39, 55–61 (describing the definitional challenges with the commercial speech doctrine).
91 See Ariix, LLC v. NutriSearch Corp., 985 F.3d 1107, 1115 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Commercial speech is ‘usually defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction.’ . . . Courts view ‘this definition [as] just a starting point,’ however, and instead try to give effect to ‘a “common-sense distinction” between commercial speech and
other varieties of speech.’”) (first quoting United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S.
405, 409 (2001); and then quoting Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 516
(7th Cir. 2014)).
92 Id. at 1115–20 (quoting First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1272 (9th Cir.
2017) (applying the Bolger factors); see also, e.g., N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors, Inc. v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 840–41 (2d Cir. 1994) (reasoning that a geographically limited nonsolicitation statute is “properly classified as commercial” because “[o]ther courts that have considered similar restrictions have concluded that the solicitation of homeowners by realtors
seeking the right to list and sell residential real estate ‘is primarily aimed at proposing a
commercial transaction’” (quoting Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1297 (7th Cir. 1988)
(collecting cases)).
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Casting Salary-History Inquiries as Commercial Speech

Even though the Supreme Court has yet to announce
whether speech in the context of an employment interview is
commercial speech,93 it is highly likely that a court would review
salary-history bans under the commercial speech framework. As
a starting point, the transactional nature of an employment interview and wage negotiation should be sufficient to tip the scale in
favor of scrutinizing these inquiries under the commercial speech
standard. The purpose of a typical job interview is to negotiate
the commercial exchange of labor. Although there may be some
complexity added when these interactions are intertwined with
other forms of protected speech—like political or religious expressions—when they are not, there is strong support for the
conclusion that employment interviews, transactions, and other
recruitment-related speech are properly characterized as commercial speech.94
Moreover, as Chamber I and Chamber II indicate, courts will
likely maintain this understanding of commercial speech in the
context of salary-history bans. Despite the Chamber’s attempt to
convince the court that salary-history inquiries are not commercial speech, both the district and appellate courts disagreed with
this argument.95 In accordance with the reasoning described
above, the Chamber I court noted that “[The Philadelphia ordinance] prohibits Philadelphia-based employers from asking potential hires about their previous wage history. . . . in the context
of a job application or job interview, both of which propose a commercial transaction.”96 The Chamber II court agreed with this
conclusion in full.97 And, despite lacking a directly analogous case,
neither court spent a considerable amount of time grappling with
the question of whether the commercial speech doctrine applied,
lending further support to the idea that a future court, when applying common sense, would come to the same conclusion.

93

See Lester-Abdalla, supra note 4, at 706.
See Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First
Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31, 47–49 (2016); Norton, supra note 59, at 727; see also
Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The act of soliciting work
as a day laborer may communicate a political message, but the primary purpose of the
communication is to advertise a laborer’s availability for work and to negotiate the terms
of such work.”).
95 See Chamber I, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 782; Chamber II, 949 F.3d at 136–37.
96 Chamber I, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 783.
97 Chamber II, 949 F.3d at 137.
94
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Thus, while the boundary between commercial and noncommercial speech is often ambiguous—arguably “a distinction [ ]
with no basis in the Constitution, with no justification in the real
world, and that must often be applied arbitrarily in any but the
easiest cases”98—courts continue to make this distinction. For
salary-history bans, it is clear that courts have understood—and
likely will continue to understand—that salary-history inquiries
are a transactionally motivated form of speech. Therefore, despite
ambiguity in the doctrine, this Comment will continue on the
sound assumption that salary-history bans are properly analyzed
under the commercial speech framework.
III. CAN SALARY-HISTORY BANS SURVIVE CENTRAL HUDSON?
Once speech has been categorized as commercial, it becomes
subject to the intermediate scrutiny test articulated in Central
Hudson. As noted in Part II.A, the Central Hudson test has four
factors. First, a court must determine whether the speech is misleading or pertains to unlawful activity.99 In the case of a salaryhistory inquiry, that is clearly not an issue. Outside the context
of any regulated employment matters, there is surely nothing unlawful or misleading about asking a person for their prior pay.100
Second, the court asks whether the government has asserted a
substantial interest underlying the regulation.101 Here, again, a
state or locality would have no trouble demonstrating this factor—the government interest in reducing wage disparity is undoubtedly compelling enough to carry this burden.102 Unfortunately, at this point, the easy questions have been answered. For
commercial speech that is not misleading, coercive, or unlawful,
once the government has demonstrated a compelling reason for a
speech regulation, the court is tasked with evaluating, third,
whether the government has “demonstrate[d] that the challenged

98

Kozinski & Banner, supra note 62, at 648.
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64 (“The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it or commercial speech related
to illegal activity.” (citations omitted)).
100 This presumes that the EPA does not prohibit such inquiries, but that question is
not the subject of this Comment. See infra Part III.A.
101 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
102 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (ruling that Minnesota’s
“compelling interest in eradicating [gender] discrimination” justified an infringement on
the right to associate). This point is also acknowledged in Chamber I, in which “[t]he parties agree[d] that the City has a substantial interest in promoting wage equity and reducing discriminatory wage disparities.” 319 F. Supp. 3d at 787.
99
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regulation ‘advances the Government’s interest in a direct and
material way’” 103 and, fourth, whether there is a “narrow tailoring
of the challenged regulation to the asserted interest.”104
With the standard in mind, it is useful to return a final time
to the Chamber I and Chamber II decisions. As an initial matter,
neither case put the first two Central Hudson factors into serious
contention.105 Rather, the primary line of disagreement between
the courts in Chamber I and Chamber II pertained to the third
Central Hudson factor. Specifically, Chamber I concluded that
that the government had failed to show that the salary-history
ban would directly advance the city’s interest in reducing genderwage inequality.106 The lower court argued that the government
had presented only “unsubstantiated conclusions.”107 Although
the court did not doubt the credentials of the witnesses who testified to the effect of the salary-history ban, it found that the experts’ conclusions were “mostly conjectural in nature” and that
they had failed to provide “any study, data, statistics, report, or
any other evidence to support the proposition that initially depressed wages reflect discrimination.”108 The appellate court disagreed. The Chamber II court concluded that the city had presented sufficient data to prove its point109 and that, even if it
hadn’t, the city did not need to empirically demonstrate the efficacy of the ordinance;110 it was sufficient that the city had “made
a reasonable judgment that a wage-history ban would further the
[ ] goal of closing the gap.” 111 Notice, however, that the conflict
between the two courts was largely driven by an evidentiary disagreement. Thus, while these decisions do well to frame the arguments that future courts might need to consider, their reasoning is easily cabined to the facts of the case, leaving the broader
constitutionality of these laws unsettled.

103 Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
104 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).
105 See Chamber I, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 787. Although Philadelphia argued that the
wage inquiries were unlawful under the second Central Hudson factor, both courts quickly
dismissed that argument. See Chamber II, 949 F.3d at 142.
106 Chamber I, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 800.
107 Id. at 797.
108 Id.
109 See Chamber II, 949 F.3d at 149.
110 See id.
111 Id. at 143. Though dicta, this willingness to defer to the city’s judgment is consistent with an analysis of novel commercial speech regulations for which substantial evidence might not be available. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, the main contribution that this Comment seeks
to provide is a universal discussion about how future courts
should apply the direct advancement prong when evaluating
challenges to salary-history bans. That discussion will occur in
Part III.B–D, but first, it is worth a short digression to review the
fourth Central Hudson factor: whether salary-history bans, if
they do directly advance the government interest, are narrowly
tailored in doing so. Consistent with the discussion below, the
Chamber II court found that the Philadelphia ordinance satisfied
this factor because “[t]he Ordinance simply seeks to insulate any
discriminatory impact of prior salary levels on subsequent
wages,” without otherwise restricting employers’ ability to obtain
information about applicants.112
A.

The Narrowly Tailored Prong

The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test requires courts
to determine whether a government regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest. This prong is not
the primary focus of this Comment; however, as it is a necessary
hurdle to demonstrate the constitutionality of a salary-history
ban, it cannot be ignored. Indeed, opponents to salary-history
bans might argue that these laws are not narrowly tailored because they sweep in potentially legitimate questions about salary
history.113
As other authors have concluded, it is improbable that the
government would fail to satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement.114 First, as will be discussed in Part III.B, salary-history
bans are not enacted to target discriminatory intent, but rather
to eradicate the discriminatory effect of wage history. In this regard, all salary-history information falls within the scope of the
government’s interest.115 Second, in light of the goal of closing the
112

Chamber II, 949 F.3d at 154–55.
See Reply Brief for Appellee at 22–25, Chamber II, 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020)
(No. 18-2175).
114 See Lester-Abdalla, supra note 4, at 728–32.
115 The Chamber II court considered, but ultimately disregarded, an argument that
the Philadelphia salary-history ban is overbroad because it also applies to male applicants.
See 949 F.3d at 155 (“Aside from the clear equal protection implications. . . . a system that
perpetuates higher salaries for men based on their higher salary histories is no better than
one that perpetuates lower salaries for women and minorities based on their lower salary
histories.”). Other courts would likely come to the same conclusion. See Went For It, 515
U.S. at 632–33 (rejecting an overbreadth argument against a Florida law—designed to
protect especially vulnerable accident victims from legal solicitation—even though the law
did not “distinguish between victims in terms of the severity of their injuries”).
113

1268

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:5

wage gap, the bans prevent only one specific question in the employment process.116 To that end, the bans have no impact on the
accessibility of any information other than the wage history that
legislatures have sought to neutralize. Even under this limitation, employers are still free to ask about salary preferences, and
candidates are still largely able to voluntarily disclose their own
wage histories.117 Therefore, salary-history bans do not “seek[ ] to
prevent [the information’s] dissemination completely.”118 For
these reasons, salary-history bans are narrowly designed to remove tainted salary-history information from the employment
process without impeding an employer’s ability to obtain otherwise necessary information from applicants.
With this prong established, this Comment now shifts its focus to its primary argument that salary-history bans, as a whole,
directly advance the government interest in closing the genderwage gap. In the next three Sections, this Comment will first introduce and describe the standard for direct and material advancement. Next, it will revisit the EPA circuit split discussed in
Part I.A. In doing so, it will seek to explain why—despite clear
disagreement about the discriminatory nature of salary-history
inquiries—courts should take a uniform, effects-based approach
when analyzing the constitutionality of salary-history bans. Finally, it provides a comprehensive review of the direct advancement prong as it applies to salary-history bans, ultimately concluding that the bans should withstand First Amendment
scrutiny under Central Hudson.
B.

The Standard for Direct and Material Advancement

Although Central Hudson laid the foundation for what would
become the rigorous four-part test described above, the decision
116

See Lester-Abdalla, supra note 4, at 728–29.
Here, it is worth noting again that some bans, like the one in Illinois, do not permit
employers to rely on voluntarily disclosed salary-history information. See supra Part I.B.
This feature is likely not detrimental to the constitutionality of such laws, but it may factor
into a court’s analysis. See Chamber II, 949 F.3d at 154–56 (reasoning that voluntary disclosure supports a judgment that the Philadelphia salary-history ban is narrowly tailored,
but focusing primarily on the fact that the ban “leav[es] employers free to ask a wide range
of other questions” and “does not prohibit employers from obtaining market salary information from other sources”).
118 Lester-Abdalla, supra note 4, at 729 (alterations in original) (quoting Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771). This makes salary-history bans even less restrictive than
other—presumably constitutional—laws that “prohibit[ ] queries soliciting information
about applicants’ disability status, sexual orientation, marital status, or other protected
characteristics.” Norton, supra note 59, at 727.
117
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only briefly addressed the requirement that a government regulation must directly advance the stated substantial interest. The
Court cited only two cases to establish that it had previously “declined to uphold regulations that only indirectly advance the state
interest involved.”119 The Central Hudson Court also spent little
time applying this criterion to the facts of the case, devoting fewer
than two hundred words to the matter before finding that the ban
on the promotion of electrical utilities directly advanced the government interest in energy conservation. Even though the Court
thought that the ban’s impact was “highly speculative,” it was
satisfied by the fact that “[t]here is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity.”120 Therefore, while
this factor is clearly a critical component for evaluating a regulation affecting commercial speech, Central Hudson left a tremendous amount of ambiguity about what it takes for the government
to satisfy its burden.
The next development in the commercial speech doctrine
came in the 1993 Edenfield v. Fane121 decision. This case centered
on a Florida Board of Accountancy rule that “provide[d] that a
CPA ‘shall not by any direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation solicit an engagement to perform public accounting services . . .
where the engagement would be for a person or entity not already
a client of [the CPA], unless such person or entity has invited such
a communication.’” 122 Here, unlike in Central Hudson, the Court
spent a considerable amount of time grappling with whether the
government had sufficiently justified the regulation. The Court
recognized that the Board of Accountancy had asserted a substantial interest—“protecting consumers from fraud or overreaching
by CPA’s. . . . [and] maintain[ing] both the fact and appearance of
CPA independence in auditing a business and attesting to its financial statements.”123 But the Court was unconvinced that the rule
“advance[d] its asserted interests in any direct and material way.”124
119 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (“The Court noted in Virginia State Board
that ‘[t]he advertising ban does not directly affect professional standards. . . .’ In Bates,
the Court overturned an advertising prohibition that was designed to protect the ‘quality’
of a lawyer’s work. ‘Restraints on advertising . . . are an ineffective way of deterring shoddy
work.’” (first quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769; and then quoting Bates
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 378 (1977))).
120 Id. at 569.
121 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
122 Id. at 763–64 (second alteration in original) (quoting FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 21A24.002(2)(c) (1992)).
123 Id. at 768.
124 Id. at 771.
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The Court did not state its intent behind adding the term
“and material” to the test. However, its inclusion certainly seems
to suggest a heightened burden on the government to demonstrate
not only that its regulation is targeted to advance the specific interest it asserts125 but also that it has a significant effect in achieving that objective.126 To that end, the Court made a point to emphasize that the Board of Accountancy had “present[ed] no
studies that suggest personal solicitation of prospective business
clients by CPA’s creates [ ] dangers of fraud, overreaching, or compromised independence,” nor did it “disclose any anecdotal evidence, either from Florida or another State, that validates the
Board’s suppositions.”127 Clearly, under Central Hudson and
Edenfield, direct and material advancement cannot be shown
without at least some empirical or anecdotal evidence. This, however, leaves unanswered the question of what would be sufficient.
While the Court has never explicitly stated the government’s
evidentiary burden, over the course of numerous opinions, it has
dropped enough breadcrumbs to identify the standard. As a baseline, the government does not necessarily need to supply empirical data “accompanied by a surfeit of background information”;128
it is possible to show direct advancement “based solely on history,
consensus, and ‘simple common sense.’” 129 However, anecdotal evidence is not sufficient to save an irrational regulatory scheme.130
For example, a regulation can easily fail if it is “so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope
to exonerate it.”131 Additionally, as Edenfield makes clear, the
government must present at least some evidence to support the
conclusion that a regulation is directly and materially advancing
the stated interest.132 Finally, the more evidence that the
125 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569 (finding that “conditional and remote eventualities” cannot directly advance the government interest).
126 See Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberating Commercial Speech: Product Labeling
Controls and the First Amendment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 63, 80–81 (1995); see also 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) (“[W]e cannot agree with the assertion that
the price advertising ban will significantly advance the State’s interest in promoting temperance.” (emphasis added)).
127 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771.
128 Went For It, 515 U.S. at 628.
129 Id. (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)).
130 See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 488–90.
131 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 190; see also Rubin, 514 U.S. at 489
(noting that various provisions of the same act “directly undermine and counteract” the
effect of the challenged regulation).
132 See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770 (“[The] burden is not satisfied by mere speculation
or conjecture.”); see also Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 772 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Central
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government can supply, the stronger its case will be that the regulation serves its interest.133 However, the Court has also recognized that substantial evidence might not be available in all
cases; thus, courts should give leeway for governments implementing novel solutions.134 Accordingly, it is clear that, to survive
the direct and material advancement requirement of Central
Hudson and Edenfield, the government must provide enough evidence to show that there is a logical nexus, given the conceivably
available information, between the regulation and the interest of
concern.
C.

The EPA Circuit Split Signals the Rationality of SalaryHistory Bans

With the direct advancement standard in mind, this Comment
will now consider whether salary-history bans directly and materially advance the government’s interest in reducing wage disparity. In contemplating this issue, it is worth turning to the separate
legal challenges created by the circuit split over the application of
the EPA. Rather than attempt to resolve the split, this Comment

Hudson requires more from the government than bald assertions that a particular speech
restriction serves its articulated interests.”); Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 957 (11th
Cir. 2000) (“While empirical data supporting the existence of an identifiable harm is not a
sine qua non for a finding of constitutionality, the Supreme Court has not accepted ‘common sense’ alone to prove the existence of a concrete, non-speculative harm.”).
133 See, e.g., Chambers v. Stengel, 256 F.3d 397, 404 (6th Cir. 2001):
Defendants submitted ample evidence establishing that the statutes directly and
materially advance the state’s interests, including (1) the 106-page Florida study
from the Went For It case; (2) an affidavit from [the] Kentucky Representative . . .
who sponsored the statutes and stated that after he was involved in a vehicular
accident, he received at least fifteen solicitation letters . . .; (3) an affidavit from
the Executive Director of the Kentucky Bar Association setting forth a summary
of a Kentucky survey report, which revealed the public’s displeasure with attorney solicitation following an accident; (4) articles and letters appearing in The
Courier–Journal and the Kentucky Bench and Bar; and (5) statistics of the frequency of automobile accidents in Kentucky.
134 See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439–40 (2002)
(“[M]unicipalities must be given a ‘reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions’
to address the secondary effects of protected speech. A municipality considering an innovative solution may not have data that could demonstrate the efficacy of its proposal because the solution would, by definition, not have been implemented previously.” (quoting
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)) (quotation marks and
citation omitted)); cf. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 378 (2000) (noting, in
the context of commercial campaign finance restriction rather than commercial speech,
that “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny
of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised”).
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focuses on the promising alternative solution offered by legislative salary-history bans. Despite this focus, however, the EPA circuit split should not be ignored. From the split emerges a clear
sense of the ideological disagreement central to the salary-historyban debate. On one side of the split is the view that the EPA is
concerned with discriminatory intent and the belief that relying
on prior wages, even if they are disparate, is a nondiscriminatory
basis for setting future pay. On the other side is the argument
that relying on disparate wages is inherently discriminatory under the EPA because those wages are influenced by prior wage
discrimination. By highlighting the ideological divide driving the
EPA circuit split—namely, whether courts should focus on discriminatory intent or discriminatory effects—this Section seeks
to anticipate the fundamental objections to salary-history bans.
This Section will show, however, that these objections fail to hinder the argument that salary-history bans directly advance the
government’s interest in closing the gender-wage gap. Specifically, because Central Hudson requires an effects-based approach, salary-history-ban proponents can find support from the
side of the split that favors their position, whereas ban opponents
lack the equivalent support.
Salary-history-ban proponents argue that, because salaryhistory information is inherently linked to the history of gender
discrimination, it cannot be considered a “factor other than sex” for
the purposes of the EPA. In a 2018 case, Rizo v. Yovino,135 the Ninth
Circuit adopted this view, finding that prior salary “may bear a
rough relationship to legitimate factors other than sex, such as
training, education, ability, or experience,” but it is a “second-rate
surrogate” for these nondiscriminatory justifications. 136 Because
“gender discrimination has been baked into our pay scales,”137 the
court held that “[a]llowing prior salary to justify a wage differential . . . entrench[es] in salary systems an obvious means of discrimination—the very discrimination that the [EPA] was designed to prohibit and rectify.”138 In this regard, the Ninth Circuit
advanced an effects-based view of the EPA consistent with the application of the direct advancement factor of Central Hudson. That
is, because salary-history information is prone to gender effects,

135
136
137
138

887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 467.
Id. at 468–69 (McKeown, J., concurring).
Id. at 468 (majority opinion).
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reliance on this information tends to create further gender-wage
disparity; therefore, such reliance is inherently discriminatory.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit views salary history as a
valid metric for employers to gauge human capital.139 Although
the court recognized the existence of a wage gap, it held that market wages likely reflect more than mere discriminatory intent
meaning that salary history could be a “factor other than sex”
under the EPA.140 This holding, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s,
reflects an intent-based understanding of the EPA. This understanding follows from the difficult nature of isolating discrimination (which the government has an interest in eradicating) from
neutral business practices (with which the government generally
ought not interfere). Recognizing that tension, the majority argued that courts should be hesitant to read discriminatory intent
into salary-history inquiries.141
The Seventh Circuit’s argument presents one of the core objections that one might have to salary-history bans.142 But what
is important to see is that, although this argument is relevant
to the EPA’s proper application, it does not have any significant
bearing on the outcome of applying the Central Hudson test to
salary-history bans. As discussed earlier, the direct advancement
prong of Central Hudson is satisfied when a policy is demonstrably effective in achieving its intended purpose.143 Direct advancement is, therefore, an effects-based determination. If the government can adequately show that a salary-history ban actually
serves to close the wage gap, then the law is likely to survive judicial scrutiny under Central Hudson, regardless of whether a
court like the Seventh Circuit believes these laws to be unwise in
principle. For this reason, the policy concerns highlighted by the
Seventh Circuit are insufficient to foreclose the possibility that
salary-history bans directly advance the goal of closing the wage
gap. Conversely, the argument advanced by the Ninth Circuit—
that salary-history inquiries have an inherently discriminatory
effect impermissible under the EPA—demonstrates the clear viability of the argument that banning salary-history inquiries

139 See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 470 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Wages
rise with experience as well as with other aspects of human capital.”).
140 Id.
141 See id. (“Wage patterns in some lines of work could be discriminatory, but this is
something to be proved rather than assumed.”).
142 See supra note 2.
143 See supra Part III.B.
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advances the goal of ameliorating the effects of discrimination.144
In other words, because Central Hudson would require courts to
review salary-history bans using an effects-based framework, the
Ninth Circuit’s arguments in the context of the EPA can also be
used to support the constitutionality of salary-history bans,
whereas the Seventh Circuit’s intent-based approach would provide no such support to employers seeking to challenge the bans.
Consequently, when evaluating First Amendment challenges
to salary-history bans, courts ought to be mindful that—regardless of the reasons for the wage gap and despite the objection that
salary-history bans impede an otherwise nondiscriminatory employment practice—the direct advancement prong of Central
Hudson depends only on the government’s ability to show the efficacy of the laws. Thus, there is no reason to think that, because
of the EPA circuit split, courts would be unable to find a uniform
solution to the constitutionality of salary-history bans. In the Section to follow, this Comment will assess the effect of salary-history
bans from a theoretical and empirical perspective, ultimately concluding that these laws do indeed directly and materially advance
the government’s interest in closing the gender-wage gap.
D. Salary-History Bans Directly and Materially Advance Wage
Equity
Although the arguments presented in the context of the EPA
can be applied to show that salary-history bans are facially rational
in the effects-focused context of Central Hudson, the burden remains on the government to establish that salary-history bans
directly and materially advance the stated goal of closing the
wage gap. This Section discusses in detail both the theoretical and
empirical justifications for salary-history bans. In particular, the
first part of this discussion considers the most common arguments against salary-history bans, ultimately rejecting those arguments in favor of the conclusion that salary-history bans are
uniquely positioned to achieve their primary objective. In the second part, the discussion turns to the initial body of empirical research on salary-history bans, which offers promising evidence
that salary-history bans have thus far been effective where enacted. Taking these two pieces as a whole, the Section concludes
that salary-history bans directly and materially advance the government’s interest in closing the wage gap.
144

See Chamber II, 949 F.3d at 148 (citing Rizo, 887 F.3d at 460–61).
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1. Commonsense criticisms: the ban-the-box comparison.
There is no doubt that “[b]anning questions on salary-history
is a blunt instrument to a seemingly complex problem.”145 Thus,
while the Ninth Circuit’s application of the EPA can translate to
a commonsense argument in support of salary-history bans, the
simplicity of these laws leaves room for potential commonsense
counterarguments as well. Among these counterarguments is
the intuitive comparison to a similar initiative—the “ban the
box” movement to prohibit inquiries into job applicants’ criminal
history—that gained traction around the same time as salaryhistory bans were coming to the fore.146 Using this analogy as a
backdrop, it is easy to identify the arguments most likely to be
brought against salary-history bans. But this comparison is inapt.
And from the weaknesses of the ban-the-box analogy emerge the
obvious strengths of salary-history bans.
The ban-the-box movement is an effort to improve the employment opportunities for previously incarcerated individuals.147
The specific goal of the initiative is to eliminate the commonly
used checkbox on application forms that asks whether an applicant has been convicted of a crime.148 Because the United States
has a particularly high incarceration rate—one which disproportionately impacts Black men—the “box” is seen by many as a significant obstacle to employment for previously incarcerated individuals, which may contribute to the nearly doubled
unemployment rate for Black men relative to the national average.149 By the end of 2015, thirty-four states and the District of
Columbia had enacted laws that banned the box to some extent.150
However, the story of ban the box quickly turned into a cautionary tale of unintended consequences. In a study conducted by
Professors Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr, fictitious online job applications were sent to employers in New York and New Jersey.
Taking advantage of recently enacted ban-the-box laws, Agan and
Starr measured the change in callback rate of their applicants

145

Hansen & McNichols, supra note 5, at 1.
See, e.g., Meli & Spindler, supra note 3, at 20–21.
147 See Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, The Unintended Consequences of “Ban
the Box”: Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories
Are Hidden, 38 J. LAB. ECON. 321, 330 (2020).
148 See Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Racial Discrimination: A Field Experiment, 133 Q.J. ECON. 191, 192 (2018).
149 Id. at 192.
150 Doleac & Hansen, supra note 147, at 330.
146
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under a pre- and post-ban regime.151 They found that, although
removing the box positively impacted callback rates for incarcerated individuals overall, those gains were not evenly distributed.
Instead, Agan and Starr observed that the primary beneficiaries
from ban the box were White applicants with criminal records.152
Black applicants with—and White applicants without—criminal
records saw some gains in callback rates as well.153 But for Black
applicants without criminal records, there was a striking drop in
callback rates.154 The effects were so pronounced that the authors
observed a 600% increase in the racial divide for overall callback
rates than had existed pre-ban.155
Professors Jennifer Doleac and Benjamin Hansen have seen
a similar result. Using data from the monthly Current Population
Survey, Doleac and Hansen studied the employment effect of ban
the box for “young, low-skilled, black and Hispanic men.”156 They
found that ban the box had the effect of reducing the likelihood of
employment for the observed groups, lending support to the idea
that “[ban the box] has unintentionally done more harm than
good when it comes to helping disadvantaged job seekers find
jobs.”157 In combination, these studies raise concern that when
employers lack information about applicants, they instead rely on
racially biased assumptions.158
Given the apparent similarity between criminal-history bans
and salary-history bans, opponents to salary-history laws worry
that the bans will similarly produce unintended consequences.159
For example, Doleac argues that when employers are prevented
from accessing salary-history information, they will instead rely
on assumptions that could ultimately hurt women.160 Meanwhile,
Professors Jeff Meli and James C. Spindler have argued that
151

Agan & Starr, supra note 148, at 198–202.
See id. at 222–23.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 Doleac & Hansen, supra note 147, at 324.
157 See id. at 360–62.
158 See Agan & Starr, supra note 148, at 208 (“[E]mployers who lack individualized
information might be relying on race-based assumptions about criminal record status.”);
Doleac & Hansen, supra note 147, at 360 (“BTB does not address employers’ concerns
about hiring those with criminal records and so could increase discrimination against
groups that are more likely to include recently incarcerated ex-offenders, particularly
young, low-skilled black and Hispanic men.”).
159 See supra Part I.
160 See Moore, supra note 41 (“Without information on pay history, employers will still
try to offer women lower salaries, Doleac said.”).
152
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salary-history bans could unintentionally have a detrimental impact on high-earning women.161 They posit that, under certain
conditions, employers that lack salary information are less likely
to offer competitively higher wages to women already earning
above average, imposing switching costs and potentially trapping
these women at their current—possibly discriminatory—employers.162 If this effect is pronounced, it might ultimately serve to undermine the very goal of the salary-history ban by increasing the
overall gender-pay gap.163
In addition to these general criticisms, two specific—and
common—features of salary-history bans might be identified by
critics as creating unintended consequences. First, a number of
salary-history bans allow applicants to voluntarily disclose their
own prior salaries, which could lead to an unraveling effect.164 Because employers currently use wage history as a metric to measure both productivity and future pay preferences, applicants—
theoretically aware that employers cannot ask for this information—might choose to use voluntary disclosure as a signaling
device. Opponents to salary-history bans could argue that this incentive leads to an adverse selection problem when, by comparison, those who choose not to disclose may be looked upon less favorably.165 For those in the middle, this pattern of behavior might
create pressure to disclose, which, in turn, puts pressure on the
remaining nondisclosing individuals to do the same.166
The second argument is that the ability for employers to ask
applicants for their desired wage creates a loophole to the salaryhistory ban.167 As repeatedly noted, employers value salary-history
information, and when this information is hidden, employers
might seek other ways to obtain it. By asking about desired salary, employers might be able to get a rough sense of the wage a
potential applicant would be willing to accept. However, the problem with this practice is that, because prior salaries are affected
161

Meli & Spindler, supra note 3, at 11–14.
Id. at 7–9.
163 Id. at 44–48.
164 See Amanda Agan, Bo Cowgill & Laura Katherine Gee, Do Workers Comply with
Salary History Bans? A Survey on Voluntary Disclosure, Adverse Selection, and Unraveling, 110 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 215, 219 (2020).
165 See id. at 218–19.
166 See id. at 219; Hansen & McNichols, supra note 5, at 3 (“If a past salary is a strong
signal of both productivity and their reservation wage, we might expect all workers to
reveal their salary to avoid being lumped in with workers with lower prior earnings.” (citing Agan et al., supra note 164)).
167 See Agan et al., supra note 164, at 215.
162
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by wage disparity, desired future wages might also suffer from
gender effects. If employers broadly adopt the practice of asking
for desired salary, there is some risk that salary-history bans will
be rendered ineffective.
2. The defense of salary-history bans.
When considering the arguments above, it is obvious why
comparisons are drawn between the salary-history bans and banthe-box initiatives. Upon closer inspection, however, key distinctions emerge. These distinctions not only demonstrate why the
ban-the-box-style criticisms are misguided; they also highlight
the clear benefits that a salary-history ban might bring.
First, the typical salary-history inquiry occurs at a later stage
of hiring than the typical criminal-history inquiry.168 The criminalhistory box is often present on application forms. Therefore, an
applicant’s criminal status is likely to create a barrier before the
interview stage. In contrast, salary-history inquiries often
(though not always) occur after an applicant has been invited to
interview.169 This makes a big difference when the backfire effect
in ban-the-box laws appears to have been driven by racially biased
assumptions that cause employers to effectively filter Black men
out of the employment process. Because the salary-history bans
often affect applicants who have already passed an initial screening, there is less of a reason to think that implicit bias would
cause women to be shut out of the employment process. Thus,
whereas ban the box has a tendency to systematically disadvantage Black men, the potential adverse effect of salary-history
bans is more likely to come into play on an individualized basis.
Second, even if the above were not the case—that is, if salaryhistory inquiries typically occurred during the initial application—the assumption of lower wages could be counteracted. Because some salary-history laws allow for voluntary disclosure,170
a woman facing a situation in which she is offered a lower wage
than deserved—either because it is lower than she presently
earns or because it is lower than the market wage for an equally
situated man—has the opportunity to negotiate in a way that is
simply not as feasible under ban the box. A Black man who is
denied an interview likely has no knowledge that the reason for

168
169
170

See Sinha, supra note 1, at 5.
See Barach & Horton, supra note 1, at 40–42.
See Sinha, supra note 1, at 5; Lester-Abdalla, supra note 4, at 729.
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his rejection is a result of a racially biased assumption. Even if he
has his suspicions, there is little opportunity to counteract that
negative inference because this rejection typically comes before
the interview stage. With salary-history bans, voluntary disclosure provisions allow women to negotiate around an artificially
low salary offer.171 That is, women could selectively disclose in situations when it will boost their salary options without being burdened by past discriminatory wages when it would be a detriment.
Of course, voluntary disclosure is also the root of the concern
for a potential unraveling effect. And this concern might be justified if there were a significant portion of the population that regularly disclosed wages without prompting.172 But there isn’t. In
fact, the only time that the majority of applicants disclose wage
history is when they are prompted to do so by the employer.173
Moreover, if an applicant is unaware—as many likely are—
whether his or her interviewer is constrained by a salary-history
ban, that applicant is unlikely to deviate from his or her normal
disclosure tendencies.174 Even if an applicant is aware that a ban
has been enacted, it is uncertain whether he or she would be sufficiently attuned to the behavior of other applicants to feel pressure to voluntarily disclose. Thus, if voluntary disclosure behavior is generally unchanged following a salary-history ban,
employers would have no reason to treat an instance of nondisclosure as a negative signal.
In contrast to the fact that salary-history inquiries typically
precede an offer, voluntary disclosure allows women to control
when, if ever, it is to their advantage to leverage their prior pay.
As noted above, there is likely not going to be a significant population that voluntarily discloses during an interview. Thus, without a salary-history ban in place, salary-history information is
typically disclosed pre-offer. But with a ban in place, it is likely
more beneficial for the applicant to keep his or her wage history
private until after receiving an offer. By waiting for an offer, applicants have the opportunity to voluntarily disclose prior salary
information as a way to bargain upward. Presumably, applicants
will only do so if the offered salary is not more than their current
pay. In light of the foregoing, voluntary disclosure provisions are
likely more of a benefit than a detriment to women who, under
171
172
173
174

See Sinha, supra note 1, at 5.
In contrast to disclosing only to counter a low salary offer.
See Agan et al., supra note 164, at online app. tbl.A8.
See id.
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this regime, have the ability to selectively withhold information
until after employers have made the first move.
Third, the risk that desired-wage inquiries neutralize the effect of salary-history bans is minimal. In contrast to salary-history
inquiries that tie an applicant to the past, desired-wage inquiries
allow an applicant to have control over her future. Applicants are
generally aware of the estimated salary range of the position to
which they are applying. This is why, for instance, individuals are
less likely to voluntarily disclose their prior wage if they know
that it is higher or lower than the typical applicant’s.175 Moreover,
an applicant’s desired wage is almost certainly higher than her
present wage. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a desired-wage
inquiry would inhibit women’s wages as greatly as salary-history
information might. This is particularly true when women applicants can use desired salary as a way to position themselves
equivalently to their male counterparts and offset some of the effect of prior wage discrimination. Wage history, on the other
hand, does not allow women to assert wage preferences.
Salary-history bans also incentivize employers to use alternative methods for evaluating their applicants’ wage preferences.
For example, employers might choose to include the expected salary range within the original job post. Though it can be difficult
for employers to precisely estimate the market wage for a new
position, listing even a rough salary estimate serves to filter applicants with prohibitively high or unrealistically low wage preferences. This resolves the need to individually determine an applicant’s wage preferences, and it avoids having to walk the line
between a desired-wage inquiry and an impermissible salaryhistory inquiry.176 Indeed, some states that have enacted salaryhistory bans have also required employers to disclose compensation rates within their job advertisements.177
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See id. at 218, online app. tbl.A10.
It is worth noting that, although Doleac is critical of salary-history bans, she has
expressed support for publicly accessible salary posting. Jennifer Doleac (@jenniferdoleac),
TWITTER (May 13, 2019), https://twitter.com/jenniferdoleac/status/1127928712698257409
(“Some people think that banning employers from asking about prior salaries is the best
way to close the gender wage gap. You know what’s most valuable to me? Knowing what
my colleagues make.”); Jennifer Doleac (@jenniferdoleac), TWITTER (May 13, 2019),
https://twitter.com/jenniferdoleac/status/1127929166555488256 (“When I moved from
UVA to TAMU I was able to look up how much $ everyone makes . . . and that helped me
negotiate my current salary.”).
177 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-5-201 (2021).
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Fourth, and finally, by removing the salary-history inquiry,
it becomes much easier to identify discriminatory behavior. Employers who use salary-history information do so on the justification that the information provides useful data about the employee—their presumed wage preferences and their human
capital. Without this information, employers might make assumptions. But if those assumptions are based on the fact that women
are typically paid less, then the justifications for using salary history seem to fall away. Instead, it becomes clear that an employer
is paying discriminatory wages. This might, in turn, make it easier to detect discriminatory employment practices. This is not the
case, however, with ban the box. When an employer elects not to
interview a candidate, it is exceedingly difficult to determine motive—and particularly easy, given the subjective nature of hiring,
for the employer to find a nondiscriminatory justification.
3. Empirical support for the efficacy of salary-history bans.
Salary-history bans have only been around for a few years.
Therefore, there is a reduced evidentiary burden for the government to empirically prove the direct and material effect of the
law.178 This standard is not, as one might argue, a way to evade
the evidentiary burden imposed by Central Hudson, but rather a
recognition by the Court that novel solutions to complex problems
might not have an immediately obvious effect. This is a crucial
observation for salary-history bans because the full effect of these
regulations might not be understood for years.179 Salary-history
bans meet this reduced burden because they are logically designed to target and reduce the wage gap. For this reason alone,
salary-history bans are likely to survive the direct advancement
prong of the Central Hudson test. Nevertheless, although the government need not necessarily produce empirical evidence to support its claim, what limited research has been conducted on the
effect of salary-history bans further supports the efficacy of these
laws.
178
179

See supra Part III.B.
See Lester-Abdalla, supra note 4, at 733 (citations omitted):

Critics point to the fact that laws banning salary history questions have not yet
proven effective. However, it takes three to five years to adequately study the
efficacy of such laws. This should not be a prohibitive barrier to the success of
regulations such as these. . . . One cannot fall prey to the argument that you can
only pass laws once you have data on the law’s efficacy. Rather, you can only
truly study a law’s efficacy once it is enacted.
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As to the government’s primary interest, initial evidence supports the conclusion that salary-history bans are indeed effective
at reducing the gender-wage gap. In a 2019 paper, Sourav Sinha
conducted a study similar to those used to analyze the effect of
ban the box.180 Taking advantage of the staggered implementation
of salary-history bans, Sinha measured the impact of these laws
on employment outcomes.181 For private employers, Sinha “estimates a reduction in pay gap by 4.2 [percentage] points in hourly
wages, and by 4.5 [percentage] points in weekly earnings.”182 A
separate study has concluded that, “[a]s a policy directed to reduce the gender-wage gap, salary-history bans appear to be effective for job changers and [the study’s] limited evidence finds little
reason to worry about negative effects on the quality of job
matches or from adverse selection.”183 Yet another study has
found that, “at least on net, [salary-history bans] appear to be
having their intended impact, increasing the earnings for women,
particularly at an age where they likely experienced an earnings
penalty due to childbirth.”184
Beyond the positive direct impact on the wage gap, salaryhistory bans appear to create promising secondary effects. In one
of the earliest comprehensive studies of salary-history bans,
Professors Moshe Barach and John Horton found that employers
without salary history were more likely to consider a broader pool
of applicants—and, for those applicants, employers were spending more time conducting substantive evaluations.185 Moreover,
they did not find that employers were merely shifting to other
proxies to replace wage-history information.186 Further research
supports the theory that, without salary-history information to
gauge potential applicant interest, employers have a greater tendency to use tactics that are less vulnerable to the effects of discriminatory practices. Of particular note, in locations with
180

See generally Sinha, supra note 1.
Id. at 10.
182 Id. at 13. For hourly wages, this reduction was driven exclusively by gains in
women’s pay, but for weekly wages, the effect was partially caused by a reduction in
men’s pay.
183 Bessen et al., supra note 8, at 30.
184 Hansen & McNichols, supra note 5, at 5. These findings are not inconsistent with
the possibility that high-earning women fare worse in a salary-history-ban system. See
Meli & Spindler, supra note 3, at 45 (“The detriment to high performing women is balanced
somewhat by the benefits that accrue to poorly performing women, such that the aggregate
effect on the gender pay gap may be positive or negative.”).
185 Barach & Horton, supra note 1, at 3, 21–23.
186 Id. at 3, 23–26.
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salary-history bans, there is an observed increase in the rate at
which salary ranges are announced in job posts.187
The efficacy of these salary-history bans is certainly still in
need of further study, but the early indications are that, on the
whole, salary-history bans are effective at reducing pay disparity.
This demonstrates two things. First, although opinions may differ
as to whether salary-history bans are the best policy, it is clear
that they are a rational strategy for targeting wage disparity. Second, while data remains limited, preliminary research supports
that these laws have an observable effect in closing the wage gap.
In light of these observations and the earlier discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that salary-history bans meet the direct advancement standard of Central Hudson.
CONCLUSION
Salary-history bans are a permissible regulation of commercial speech. Both applications and interviews for employment are
easily identified as a commercial exchange of labor. Thus, there
is little doubt that salary-history inquiries would be characterized
as commercial speech, particularly given that analogous forms of
speech have been recognized as such. There is also little doubt
that the government has a substantial interest in gender-wage
equality. Whether the government can regulate this speech with
salary-history bans therefore likely turns on whether these bans
are actually effective. Although, at first glance, these laws share
characteristics with the oft-criticized ban-the-box movement,
they differ on key grounds, including the time of inquiry and the
ability for applicants to counteract the potentially negative effects
of employer bias. Examining the structural framework of the
bans, it is clear that legislatures can reasonably intuit that salaryhistory bans can help to close the wage gap. This intuition is also
supported by the existing data, which show early positive results
that these laws are effective in closing the wage gap. Though simple, salary-history bans therefore present an effective and targeted way to reduce the effect of wage inequality. Under the existing Central Hudson doctrine, salary-history bans should
withstand any conceivable First Amendment challenge, so governments interested in implementing these laws should feel
within their bounds to do so.
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